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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated
confers appellate jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of Appeals to
review final judgments of the District Courts of this state in
matters of this nature, upon referral from the Utah Supreme
Court.

On December 22, 1988 this appeal was poured-over from the

Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken by the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions as Receiver for Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company
("Tracy Collins") from a portion of a final judgment and order of
the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
presiding, granting judgment and setting liability on an
injunction bond ("Injunction Bond") issued by Tracy Collins as
surety.

See Appendix A.
After trial, the district court made its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions"). R.
1326-1364.

See Appendix B. The district court then entered its

Judgment on September 26, 1988 ("Judgment").

R. 1370-1377. See

Appendix C. Tracy Collins filed a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on
October 6, 1988. The district court entered its Order Denying
Tracy Collins1 Motion for New Trial on October 31, 1988. The
District Court's Order Re: Motion To Set Liability on the Bond
with Supplemental Findings of Fact was entered on October 31,
1988 ("Bond Order").

R. 1393-1397.
-1-

See Appendix D.

Tracy

Collins filed its Notice of Appeal on November 8, 1988 in which
it appealed the district court's Judgment, denial of its motion
for new trial, and the Bond Order,
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented for determination in
this appeal:
(1) Was there sufficient evidence to support the
district court's judgment for damages incurred as a result
of the wrongful injunction?
(2) Did the district court err by assessing damages on
the Bonds for damages not incurred as a result of the
wrongfully issued injunction?
(3) Did the district court err by assessing damages on
the Bonds in the amount the Sharps were undersecured?
(4) Did the district court err by assessing damages on
the Bonds in the full amount of the interest incurred on the
Trust Deed Note?
(5) Did the district court err by assessing damages on
the Bonds for attorneys' fees incurred by the Sharps in
defending against the initial motion for a temporary
restraining order?
(6) Did Tracy Collins lack power to act as a surety in
issuing the Injunction Bond?

-2-

APPLICABLE RULE
Rule 65A(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Security, Except as otherwise provided by law, no
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue
except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in
such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of
such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered
by any party who is found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings
and the Disposition Below.
The district court allowed recovery of interest,

attorneys1 fees and other damages on an injunction bond issued by
Tracy Collins.

This award represented the amount for which the

defendants/respondents John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp
("Sharps") were undersecured on their Judgment against the
plaintiffs/appellants Leon H. Saunders, et al. ("Saunders").
This action arose when Saunders enjoined the Sharps'
foreclosure sale and sought specific performance of certain
obligations under a contract of sale.

The Sharps counterclaimed,

alleging breach of contract by Saunders, claiming entitlement to
judicial foreclosure of certain property in accordance with the
trust deed and trust deed note, and asserting that Saunders1
restraining order, issued on September 4, 1986 by the Honorable
Judith Billings, was wrongful.

The initial Temporary Restraining

Order ("Initial TRO"), R. 50-51, required a bond in the amount of
$2,400.

In a hearing held in January 1987, Judge J. Dennis

Frederick continued the injunction and required additional

-3-

security in the amount of $50,000. Tracy Collins posted the
$50,000 Injunction Bond on January 11, 1988.

(The Initial TRO

and resulting injunction are hereafter collectively referred to
as the "Injunctions" and the initial cash bond and Injunction
Bond are collectively referred to as the "Bonds").
During trial on January 28, 1988, January 29, 1988, and
March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, no evidence was presented
as to those damages specifically resulting from the issuance of
the Initial TRO and Injunction.
1642-1650.

See Trial Transcript, R.

On September 16, 1988, the Sharps1 Motion to Set

Liability on the Injunction Bond was heard by the district court.
On September 26, 1988, the district court entered judgment for
the Sharps on their counterclaim against Saunders for breach of
contract.

The district court also held that the Initial TRO

entered on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued.

The district

court then awarded the Sharps judgment against the bond posted by
plaintiffs in the amount of $2,400 and against the security
posted by Tracy Collins in the amount of $28,570.63, "for which
amounts the [Sharps] are not secured by the fair market value of
the subject premises."

Judgment, R. 1373.

On October 31, 1988, the district court entered its
Bond Order with Supplemental Findings of Fact. The Bond Order
awarded the Sharps their costs and damages, including attorneys'
fees, incurred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction.
Bond Order, R. 1396.

The district court specifically found that

$5,763.55, representing 4% of the total fees related to the
-4-

defense of the overall action, was associated with the defense of
the Injunctions. The district court also found that interest had
accumulated since September 1986 when the injunction was first
issued and now far exceeded the combined amount of the Bonds.
Bond Order, R. 1396-1397.

The Judgment against Tracy Collins has

been stayed pending this appeal.
2.

Statement of Facts.
The relevant facts in this case are largely undisputed.

Many can be determined by referring to the District Court's
Findings and Conclusions, Judgment, and Bond Order.

See Appendix

B, R. 1326-1364; Appendix C, R. 1370-1377; Appendix D, R.
1393-1397.

The remaining facts were established during the

trial held on January 28, 1988, January 29, 1988 and March 22,
1988 through March 25, 1988. See Trial Transcripts, R.
1642-1650.
1.

On September 4, 1986, Saunders filed an action for

breach of contract and obtained an Initial TRO enjoining the
Sharps1 trustees1 sale of certain property located in Summit
County.

Saunders posted a cash bond in the amount of $2,400 as a

condition of the granting of the Initial TRO.

Findings and

Conclusions, R. 1352.
2.

The Sharps counterclaimed, alleging that Saunders

were in breach of contract and sought judicial foreclosure of the
property in accordance with the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note
and dissolution of the Initial TRO issued on September 4, 1986.
Findings and Conclusions, R. 1354.
-5-

3.

In January of 1987, Judge J. Dennis Frederick

continued the injunction and ordered an Injunction Bond in the
additional amount of $50,000. Tracy Collins as surety posted
this Injunction Bond on behalf of Saunders on January 11, 1988.
Findings and Conclusions, R. 1352; Bond Order, R. 1395.
4.

At trial, Mr. LeRoy J. Pia, the appraiser whose

valuations were used in determining value of the property,
testified that at the January 1987 bond hearing it was agreed
that the land would only be worth approximately $17,500 per acre
as a lower limit of value (without sewer and water), and that an
upper limit of value (without sewer and water) would be
approximately $20,000 per acre.

Trial Transcript, R. 1644 at

493-494.
5.

Following trial, the district court found that the

present fair market value of the property with one sewer and
water connection was $20,000 per acre.
6.

Bond Order, R. 1394.

Following trial, the district court found that the

present fair market value of all of the property upon which the
Sharps may foreclose pursuant to the Judgment is $728,445.00.
Bond Order, R. 1394.
7.

Under the Judgment, the district court found

various of the Saunders plaintiffs jointly and severally indebted
to the Sharps in the total amount of $759,415.63.

Bond Order, R.

1395.
8.

The district court found that the Initial TRO was

wrongfully issued, Bond Order, R. 1396, and that the Sharps were
-6-

entitled to recover on the Bonds the difference between the
damages which the court found the Sharps have suffered as a
result of Saunders' breaches of contract ($759,415.63) and the
appraised value of the collateral ($728,445.00).

Accordingly,

the Sharps are undersecured by the amount of $30,970.63. Bond
Order, R. 1394-1395.
9.

The judgment on the Bonds in the amount of

$30,970.63 was for the Sharps1 "interest, attorneys1 fees, and
other damages incurred as a result of the issuance of the
wrongful Temporary Restraining Order . . . ."

Findings and

Conclusions, R. 1363; Bond Order, R. 1396.
10.

The district court found that $5,763.55 of the

Sharps1 attorneys1 fees was incurred in defending against the
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.

Bond Order, R. 1396.

This amount was based upon Sharps1 counsel's estimate that at
least four percent (4%) of the Sharps' total fees related to the
defense of the breach of contract action was specifically related
to the defense of the Initial TRO.
11.

Id.

The district court found that interest on the

principal due under the Trust Deed Note for the period of July 1,
1986 through March 22, 1988 equalled $115,677.12. Bond Order, R.
1395.
12.

The district court awarded the Sharps judgment on

the cash bond in the amount of $2,400.00, and "against the
security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of the Third
Judicial District Court in the amount of $28,570.63, for which
-7-

amounts the Sharps are not secured by the fair market value of
the subject premises.11
13.

Judgment, R. 1373.

The district court additionally found that the

amount of interest alone which has accumulated since September
1986, when the Injunction was first issued, far exceeds the
amount of the Bonds.

Bond Order, R. 1396-1397.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court incorrectly allowed recovery on the
Bonds for damages caused independently of the Injunctions. Only
those damages that were incurred "as a result of the wrongfully
issued injunctions" are recoverable on the Bonds. The
Injunctions were merely ancillary to the main action for breach
of contract.

The damages sought to be recovered against the

Bonds are all recoverable against the Saunders in the main
action.
Damages arising from Saunders1 breach of contract
cannot be assessed against the Bonds.

The correct measure of

damage as a result of an injunction is the difference between the
fair market value of the property on the date the injunction
prevented its sale and the fair market value on the date the
injunction was lifted.
The district court held that the fair market value of
the property on the date of judgment, which is the date the
Injunctions were dissolved, was $20,000 per acre.
1394.

See property valuation summary, Appendix E.

Bond Order, R.
The closest

valuation to the September 4, 1986 Temporary Restraining Order
-8-

was January 1987, at the hearing where the increased Injunction
Bond was ordered.
$17,500 —
493-494.

In January 1987, the fair market value was

$20,000 per acre. Trial Transcript, R. 1644 at
Therefore, the Injunctions resulted in no decrease in

the fair market value of the property.
The district court erred in awarding attorneys1 fees
for resisting the Initial TRO as damages on the Bonds. Only
attorney's fees expended in dissolving an injunction are
recoverable.

Thus, the specific award of attorneys1 fees in the

amount of $5,762.55 must be reduced by the amount of fees
incurred in defending against the Initial TRO and the district
court should be directed to determine the amount of attorneys'
fees, if any, associated with efforts expended to dissolve the
Injunctions.

However, this Court may find that the Injunctions

were so ancillary to the main breach of contract action that no
damages for attorneys1 fees are recoverable on the Bonds.
Appellant asserts for the first time that Tracy Collins
lacked the power to act as a surety and that its actions in
issuing the Injunction Bond are ultra vires and void.
ARGUMENT
I.

ONLY DAMAGES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE WRONGFULLY
ISSUED INJUNCTIONS ARE RECOVERABLE.
Under Rule 65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

and the terms of Tracy Collins1 Injunction Bond, Appendix A, the
Sharps are only entitled to recover "costs [or] damages incurred
as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction."

-9-

Mountain

States Tel, & Tel, Co, v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681
P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984).

Recoverable damages under an

injunction bond are limited to those that "arise from the
operation of the injunction itself and not from damages
occasioned by the suit independently of the injunction."

Beard

v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Lever
Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 120
(4th Cir. 1976)).

The district court failed to adhere to these

requirements when it awarded the Sharps damages for the amount
the principal judgment was undersecured.

This measure of damages

is based on the suit independently of the Injunctions and was
incorrect.
Although Tracy Collins may have been a surety for all
damages caused as a result of the Injunctions, it did not assume
liability as a guarantor for the Sharps' damages flowing from
Saunders1 breach of contract.

The Sharps1 damages resulting from

the underlying suit for breach of contract are not recoverable
from the Bonds.-

Carr v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co.y 228 Va.

644, 325 S.E. 2d 86, 89-90 (1985).

In its Supplemental Findings of Fact, the district court
found that the Sharps1 damages for breach of the Trust Deed
and Trust Deed Note were $759,415.63. Bond Order, R. 1395.
This amount included all attorneys' fees in defending the
action and in prosecuting their claims against the Saunders,
plus interest under the Trust Deed Note. Id.
In addition,
the district court found that the present fair market value
of the property was $728,445.00. Bond Order, R. 1394.
Accordingly, the Sharps1 judgment against the Saunders for
breach of contract was undersecured by the amount of
$30,970.63. Id., R. 1395. This amount was awarded against
the Bonds. Id.
-10-

The proper measure of damages is the reduction or
diminution in the value of the security during the period of
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. First Natfl Bank of Nev., 83

restraint.

Nev. 196, 427 P.2d 1, 4 (1967).

The Glens Falls court stated

that:
If the property was not sold, we fail to see where
respondent suffered any damages because its accruing
interest at the contract rate, and the cost of preserving
and maintaining the property and expenses of the default
proceedings may still be recovered either upon the default
being cured by payment or ultimately upon the trustee's
sale.
Id. at 4.
In Carr v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 325 S.E. 2d at
90, where the sale of property was stopped by a wrongfully issued
injunction, the court stated that:
[t]he proper measure of a decrease in market value of
property caused by delay resulting from wrongful issuance of
an injunction is the difference in market value at the time
it would have been sold absent any restraint and the market
value when the injunction no longer prevented the sale.
JEd. S^e Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So. 2d 807, 809
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) cert, denied, 260 So.2d 520 (1972)
(proper measure of damages is the fair market value of the
premises at the time the wrongful restraint was imposed compared
with the value of the property the day the injunction was
dissolved).
The Sharps failed to meet their burden of proving both
the amount and the cause of damages.

It is especially important

for the court to evaluate the source of the Sharps1 damages since
the Injunctions were only ancillary to the principal relief
-11-

sought.

Id.
Following trial, the district court found that the

present fair market value of the property was $20,000 per acre.
Bond Order, R. 1394; Appendix E.

At trial, Mr. LeRoy J. Pia, the

appraiser whose valuations were used to determine present fair
market value, testified that at the January 1987 bond hearing the
property was worth approximately $17,500 per acre as a lower
. .
2/
limit of value with an upper limit around $20,000 per acre.Trial Transcript, R. 1644 at 493-494. Thus, on the date the
Injunctions were dissolved, the fair market value of the property
was approximately the same as the fair market value of the
property on the date of restraint.
From the only evidence in the record, the delay caused
by the wrongful Injunctions resulted in no decrease in the market
3/
value of the property.

Consequently, no damages- are

recoverable on the Bonds as no damages were "incurred as a result
of the wrongfully issued injunction."

Mountain States Tel. &

Tel. Co. v. Atkinr Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d at 1262.
See Beard v. Duqdale, 741 P.2d at 969; Carr v. Citizens Bank and
Trust Co., 325 S.E. 2d at 90; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Nev., 427 P.2d at 4.
No evidence was introduced as to the fair market value of
the property with one sewer and water connection on
September 4, 1986. The closest appraisal to the date of the
Initial TRO is the January 1987 appraisal.
However, damages for attorneys1 fees expended in dissolving
an injunction may be recoverable, as is more fully discussed
in Point III, infra.
-12-

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CONTRACT INTEREST
AS RECOVERABLE DAMAGE ON THE BONDS.
The district court found that the interest accumulated

since September 1986, when the Injunctions were first issued, far
exceeds the amount of the Bonds. Bond Order, R. 1396-1397. Not
only does this approach obscure the true source of the Sharps1
damages, but it is based on the mistaken belief that interest on
a Trust Deed Note is properly assessed against an injunction bond
when the sale of property is delayed.
The proper approach is to distinguish damages, such as
interest on the Trust Deed Note, which are recoverable in the
main contract action, from damages incurred as a result of the
wrongfully issued injunction.

In Glens Fallsr the Nevada Supreme

Court reversed the lower court's award of interest damages on an
injunction bond and stated, as follows:
Appellant, as surety under the restraining order bond, was
no party to that contract, nor did its assurance run to the
performance of the contract. Furthermore, when the property
is ultimately sold under the trust deed or the default
cured, the beneficiary would receive in either event its
interest at the contract rate. Thus if the measure of
damages was interest, either at the contract or legal rate,
beneficiary would enjoy double recovery. [The surety's]
undertaking against loss, in the event the restraint was
improper, was only to "damages and costs" sustained or
incurred by reason of the restraining order.
427 P.2d at 4.
The damages assessed against the Bonds include contract
interest that was also awarded on the Judgment.

Facts and

Conclusions, R. 1343, 1361-1362; Appendix E. Nowhere did the
district court find that the interest "directly" or "proximately"
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arose out of the wrongful issuance of the Injunctions.

These

damages must be separated from those occasioned by the underlying
suit.

Beard v. Duqdale, 741 P.2d at 969 (citations omitted).
The district court supposedly avoided the "double

recovery" concern of the Glens Falls court by only awarding
interest damages up to the amount the Judgment was undersecured.
This interpretation of Glens Falls not only ignores the holding
of the Nevada Supreme Court that the proper measure of damages
would be the reduction or diminution in the value of the security
during the period of restraint, but also ignores the extent of
Tracy Collins' undertaking.

Tracy Collins was a surety only for

those damages caused as a result of the wrongful injunction, not
a guarantor of the Saunders1 performance under their contract
with the Sharps.

Furthermore, since the property has not been

sold, the Sharps could receive a "double recovery" if the
property sells for more than the present fair market valuation.
The Sharps may argue that this is a remote possibility, but it
nevertheless illustrates what the Glens Falls court was
attempting to avoid.

The Sharps have their remedy for accrued

interest against the Saunders and this Court should not hold the
surety liable for a contract undertaking that Tracy Collins did
not assume.
There is no controlling Utah precedent addressing the
recoverability of interest.

However, Utah cases addressing Rule

65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure support the denial of
the recovery of interest on the Trust Deed Note as damages on the
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Bonds.

Cf. Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d at 969;cMountain States

Tel. & Tel. Co, v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d at
1262.

Just as the Supreme Court of Nevada denied interest as an

appropriate measure of damages in Glens Falls, this Court should
also reverse the district court's award of interest on the Bonds.
Such a ruling would not deny the Sharps1 recovery
because they retain a judgment for the same interest against the
Saunders for breach of contract.

It merely separates damages

arising from the Injunctions from those awarded against the
breach of contract action and gives proper effect to Rule 65A(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING THE RECOVERABLE
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES ON THE BONDS.
The District Court found that $5,762.55 of the Sharps1
attorneys1 fees were incurred in defending against the Motion for
a Temporary Restraining Order.

This amount was based solely on

the estimate of opposing counsel that approximately four percent
(4%) of the Sharps1 total attorneys1 fees related to the breach
of contract action were specifically related to the defense of
the Initial TRO.

Bond Order, R. 1396.

It is undisputed that

certain types of attorneys1 fees are recoverable on an injunction
bond in Utah.

See Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968. However, such

attorneys1 fees are limited only to the hours spent by the
Sharps1 counsel as a result of the wrongfully issued Injunctions.
Id. at 969. The District Court erred in not requiring a specific
showing of attorneys1 fees expended "as a result" of the
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Injunctions and further erred in including in the award of
attorneys' fees an amount for time expended in resisting the
issuance of the Initial TRO.
Recoverable damages on an injunction bond include
reasonable attorneys'- fees rendered in proceedings directed at
removing an injunction.

State ex rel. County of Shannon v.

Chilton, 626 S.W. 2d 426, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).

However, fees

incurred in resisting the initial issuance of an injunction are
not recoverable.
Va. 1985).

Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E. 2d 885, 889 (W.

It was error for the district court to include in its

award of attorney's fees an amount for resisting the Initial TRO.
Braun v. Intercontinental Bank, 452 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. App.
1984) (attorneys' fees awarded must be restricted to services
rendered in undoing a wrongful injunction).
In the case at bar, the Sharps did not attempt to have
the Injunctions dissolved.

Instead, the Sharps proceeded to

judgment against Saunders on their contract claims.

The focus of

the district court was not the Injunctions, but the Sharps' right
to relief in the principal case.
an ancillary matter.

Thus, the Injunctions were only

See, e.g., Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E.

2d at 886-87; Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So.2d at
810.

"[I]t is incumbent on the plaintiff to show either that

injunction was the sole relief to which the suit pertained, or
that the fees and expenses were paid out solely for the purpose
of procuring a dissolution of the injunction, as distinguished
from expenditures for the hearing of the principal issues
-16-

involved in the case."

Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E. 2d at 889

(quoted citation omitted).

The failure of the district court to

segregate those services performed in dissolving the injunction
is reversible error.

Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254

So. 2d at 810.
Ordinarily, a case of this nature should be remanded to
the district court with the direction to obtain specific evidence
as to the amount of attorneys' fees expended, if any, in seeking
the dissolution of the Initial TRO and the resulting Injunction.
However, since no motion attempting to dissolve the injunction
was filed, this Court can conclude that the issuance of the
Injunctions relative to the whole action was so ancillary as to
result in a de minimus award of attorneys1 fees.

Absent a

specific and segregated accounting, the Sharps should take
nothing on the Bonds for their attorneys' fees.
IV.

TRACY COLLINS LACKED THE POWER TO ACT AS SURETY ON THE
INJUNCTION BOND,
Surety/Appellant submits that Tracy Collins lacked

power to issue the Injunction Bond and thus its issuance is an
ultra vires act and void.

Counsel for Tracy Collins

understandably failed to raise this issue below because to do so
could have exposed Tracy Collins and its officers and directors
to possible liability.

In director and officer liability suits

the courts have created the doctrine of adverse domination which
recognizes that a party cannot be expected to bring suit against
himself.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp, v. Hudson, 673 F. Supp.
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1039, 1043 (D. Kan. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Carlson,
698 F. Supp. 178, 180 (D. Minn. 1988) (doctrine of adverse
domination tolls statute of limitations as long as the parties
against whom the claims are brought controlled the bank).

The

Commissioner of Financial Institutions as Receiver has stepped
into the shoes of Tracy Collins and as a non-control party should
now be entitled to raise this issue for the first time.
Under Utah law, a banking corporation's general powers
are limited.

It is an established principle of banking law that

a bank does not have the power to act as a surety or guarantor.
See Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Jefferson Trust Co.f 14 N.J. Misc.
656, 186 A. 732, 734 (N.J. 1936) (both an accommodation guaranty
made for the benefit of another and an indemnity agreement were
outside the corporate powers and were, therefore, void as ultra
vires acts).

A national "bank has no power to act as a guarantor

or surety upon the obligation of another."

American Empire Ins.

Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank of Wilkes-Barre, 409 F. Supp. 459, 463
(M.D. Penn. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1977).

See Utah

Code Annotated, S 7-3-17 (the business of banking includes "all
powers and authority that a national bank having its principal
office in this state possesses").

By analogy, Tracy Collins, as

a state chartered member bank of the Federal Reserve System,
should also be restricted from acting as a guarantor or surety.
Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp.
557, 559 (N.D. Ga. 1980) suggests that the FDIC regulations
prohibiting member banks from executing contracts of guaranty or
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surety under 12 C.F.R. section 332.1 also apply to nonmember
banks.
Even though this issue was not raised below, the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, now Appellant herein,
urges this Court to consider sua sponte whether Tracy Collins1
issuance of its Injunction Bond is a prohibited ultra vires act,
which is void from its inception.
CONCLUSION
The district court misapplied the law and Tracy
Collins1 statutory and contractual undertaking to assure the
payment of only those damages incurred as a result of the
wrongfully issued Injunctions.

Such damages do not include

attorneys1 fees incurred in defending against the Initial TRO and
they do not include contract damages such as interest. The
evidence before the district court demonstrated that the fair
market value of the property was approximately the same on the
date of restraint and date of judgment.

In light of this

evidence, the district court committed error in awarding interest
damages on the Bonds. The judgment of the district court should
be reversed and remanded for the taking of evidence on the
limited issue of the amount of attorneys1 fees that resulted from
the Sharps' efforts to dissolve the Initial TRO and resulting
injunction.
However, this Court may simply reverse the district
court's Judgment by concluding that the Injunctions were so
ancillarv to the main action that not even damages for attorneys'
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fees are recoverable on the Bonds.

Finally, this Court should

rule sua sponte that Tracy Collins lacked the power to issue the
Injunction Bond and, therefore, that the Injunction Bond is void.
DATED this / f — d a y of

:anford B. Owen
Patrick L. Anderson
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellant
Commissioner of Financial
Institutions as Receiver for
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust
Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,is JT/ I day of July, 1989, I

This is to certify that on this

caused to be mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Surety/Appellant, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
Glen D. Watkins, Esq.
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Attorneys for Saunders, Felton and White Pine
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
Kathy A.F. Davis, Esq.
Tamara K. Prince, Pro hac vice
WINDER & HASLAM
Attorneys for John and Geraldine Sharp
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Glen D. Watkins, Esq. (#3397)
Mark R. Gayiord, Esq. (#5073)
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Sixth. Floor, Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (301) 532-7520
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND POR.SALT LAEE COUNTT
STATS OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
COR?., a Utah corporation;
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utahgeneral partnership? and
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,
Plaintiffs,
v.

JOHN C. SHARP, GERALDINE Y.
SHARP, and ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
as Trustee,

Case No. C87-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

SNOW ALL MSN BY THESE PRESENTS, that White Pine Ranches, a
Utah partnership, White Pine Enterprises, a Utah partnership, Leon H. Saunders,
Saunders Land Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation, Robert Feiton, J.
Richard Rees (collectively "Plaintiffs"), as principals, and Tracy Collins Bank <Jc
Trust Company ("Tracy"), a Utah banking corporation as surety ("Surety"), are held
and firmly bound unto John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp, defendants in the
above-entitled action, in the sua of Fifty Thousand-Dollars' (SSff.ffTO).

APPENDIX A

WHEREAS, the defendants have been temporarily restrained by a
temporary restraining order, dated September 4> 1S8S which remains in effect
pursuant to the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick's order of January 4, 1988 (the
"Order").
WHEREFORE, the conditions of the Bond are that (1) if the court
adjudges and declares that the Sharps have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained
by the Order, then Surety shall pay in full the cost and damages as the court shall
determine in accordance with Rule 65(c), Utah R. Civ. P., that the Sharps have
incurred or suffered as a result of being wrongfully enjoined or restrained*
provided* as to the Surety, such, costs and damages, shall nat exceed the, amougfcaf
the Bond; and CD if tire court adjudges and decteajtafcJtteSar^
wrongfully enjoined or restrained by the Order, then this Bond is void.
^

In connection with this Bond* Tracyr as Surety, submits itself to the
jurisdiction of this court and irrevocably appoints the cierk of this court as an
agent upon whom any papers affecting its liability on the Bond may be served, and
further agrees that its liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity
of an independent action.
DATED this

/ / ^ day of January, 1938.
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah
partnership
'/

By.

tx —^au^M.

Its,
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a Utah
partnership
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<wik H. Sa
LecTHTSaunders,
an indi

Robert Feiton, an individual

JTRicnard Rees, an individual
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SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation

Its

fJK*r>,,7j>J7-

TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST CO., a
Utah corporation

its

3

/£±~y~^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Oa this lltfr day of January, 1988, I hereby certify that I caused to be
mailed via United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing BOND, to the following:
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq.
WINDER & KASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John B. Anderson, Esq.
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Robert Feltorw Esq*
310 South Main Street, Suite 130S
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and that the original Eond was delivered to the Clerk of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, prior to 5:00 o'clock p.m. on the
aforesaid date as required by the Order of January 4, 1988, of the Eonorable
J. Dennis Frederick, Third District Judge.
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT
vs.
AND
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah
corporation,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. C87-1621

Defendants.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; KENNETH R. NORTON dba
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,

APPENDIX B

and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January. 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants
M

John

C.

and

Geraldine

Y.

Sharp

(hereinafter

the

Sharps M ) appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F.

Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

Investment

H

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Felton H ), J* Richard Rees and Saunders

Corporation

appearing

by counsel Robert M.

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.
defendant

Robert

Kenneth R. Norton

Counterclaim

("Norton") appeared through his

counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, having reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case on March 30,
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1988, having heard and ruled upon the plaintiffs' objections
to defendants' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Plaintiffs' Proposed Alternate and Additional Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on September 16, 1988, and for
good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On

or

about

December

9,

1980, Leon H. Saunders,

Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real property located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County,
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property").

(Exhibit

14).
2.

Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated

12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money
provided

"such

plans

shall

be

subject

to

the

reasonable

approval of Seller [the Sharps]."
3.

The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia:
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser
shall allow Seller to hook into the
culinary water system and sewer system
developed by Purchaser on the subject
Property at the same per-hook-up price
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of
lots developed on the subject Property.

4.
fore
they,

The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-

Summit
as

County

would

approve

the developer, must

any

provide

planned

development,

to Summit County for

approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective
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covenants.

The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District

("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved
and construction must receive final approval.
5.

Plaintiffs wanted

Property and anticipated

to promptly

develop

the Subject

the approval process would be com-

pleted by June, 1981.
6.

Prior to closing the .transaction which was the sub-

ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate
was prepared for Saunders by J. J. Johnson & Associates, engineers in Park City.
wherein

The Estimate proposed two alternatives

15 units at Saunders Ranch

(subsequently White Pine

Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various
adjacent properties
system

an economy

in order

to provide users of the water

of scale resulting

costs to each user.

(Exhibit 105).

in lower water system
Although considered by

him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals.
7.

In April,

1981, an Environmental

Impact

Statement

(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Subject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to closing.

(Exhibit 67).
8.

The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected

to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line
extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will
be signed." The EIS also provided two alternative water storage systems for the development on the Subject Property which
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would be available to other proposed developments, including
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well.
vided

that

The EIS further pro-

the internal traffic circulation

in the subject

project would be via private road.
9.

In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes

operated

under

the

assumed

name

of

White

Pine

Ranches.

(Plaintiffs' Complaint, 551 and. 5 ) .
10. Thereafter, on or about July 16, 1981, the parties
closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution
of

a Memorandum

of Closing

Terms

(Exhibit 15) executed by

Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and

the Sharps; a Special

Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and conveying

the

title

to

the

Subject

Property

to Landes, Felton,

Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note executed

by

Rentals,

Felton,
Inc. by

Saunders,

Landes, Norton

its president,

Norton,

and

Interstate

in the

amount of

$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note
(Exhibit 3) outlining the schedule of payments, and a Trust
Deed

covering

the

Subject

Property

executed

by

Saunders,

Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president,
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents").
11*

A

partnership

agreement

establishing

White

Pine

Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders,
Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners.
49).

(Exhibit

Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-
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sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White
Pine Ranches partnership.
12.

On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-

vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enterprises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing,
developing, subdividing and selling unimproved

real estate

(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit 'A1 attached" thereto, which
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres
of the Subject Property that was never platted.
13.

Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine

Enterprises, are general partnerships.
14.

Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-

ject Property were prepared by J. J. Johnson & Associates for
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plaintiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private
road concept.
not

(Exhibit 109).

These preliminary plats were

approved prior to closing because the County Attorney

would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114). A new
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit Development

("PUD-) and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-

randum of Closing Terms.
\

z

J

90

>

2

of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was
initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit
20).

JIBP
iS||2g
; «/j — a. ui

This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum

15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Ex5

hibit 15) provided as follows:
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1.
It is mutually agreed and
understood that after recordation of
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions,
and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in
principal
(but
not
including
the
earnest money and down payment money),
Seller shall execute and deliver to
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.)
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro/ided as follows:
2.
Upon the payment of the
release price, Buyer shall be entitled
to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of the payment
or at any time thereafter.
(Emphasis
added.)
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
3. It is agreed that, at the time
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer
has
paid
to
Seller
the
sum
of
$620,000.00 which will release from the
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon
the recordation of the PUD Plat and
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions
and Restrictions with the Summit County
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to
the release from the Deed of Trust of
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice
together with the said roadway.
(Emphasis added.)
18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro/ided as follows:
5. The proposed plat is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein.
Seller
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hereby acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original plat
prior to recordation. Changes in the
proposed plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
when prepared shall be subject to the
reasonable approval of Seller"
[Emphasis added.)
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit WAM

attached to the Memo-

randum of Closing Terms included a boundary description describing all of the Subject Property and an Owner's Dedication.

The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used

by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as originally contemplated in the EIS.

The Owner's Dedication pro-

vides in pertinent part as follows:
Know all by these present that we the
undersigned owners of the herein described tract of land, having caused
the same to be subdivided into lots
and streets to hereafter be known as
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of
the public all parcels of land shown
on this plat as intended for public
use, and do warrant, defend, and save
the city harmless against any easements or other encumbrances on the
dedicated streets which will interfere
with the city's use, operation, and
maintenance of the streets and do further dedicate the easements as shown.
(Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 20).
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in part as follows:
6. Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten and one-half (10-
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1/2) foot strip of land outlined in
red on Exhibit "A".
Said conveyance
shall be for the sole purpose of
widening the County roadway. If possible, such grant shall be in the form
of an easement. The County indicates
that it is possible that the County
road as it exists is not where it is
platted.
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps.

(See Exhibit

107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34).
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in pertinent part as follows:
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller
with one (1) sewer connection and one
(1) culinary water connection into Buyer's systems at such time as each is
available, and Seller shall pay a connection fee and service fee equal to
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a
lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any
charges of Summit Water Distributing
Company.
The sewer and water connection granted above can be used by Seller in new construction if allowed on
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection
to the existing residence of Seller....
(Emphasis added.)
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represented Saunders in continuing plaintiffs' attempts, begun prior to
closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the
development.

(Exhibit 127).

24. Before

signing

1981 and subsequently

the Closing

on November
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Documents, on June 16,

1, 1983, Plaintiff White

Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pursuant

to which agreements White Pine Ranches would

receive

reimbursement for their- construction costs of the sewer line
to the development from connection fees charged to third parties connecting to that line:
Said third parties will be allowed to
connect to such lines only upon payment
to the District of the applicable number of connection fees.
The District
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs
of construction and inspection from
each such connection fee and pay the
balance of each such connection fee to
Applicant [White Pine Ranches].
(Exhibits 80 55(c) and 81 I5C).
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional developments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land,
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of
the line extension agreements.

(Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and

117).
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44)
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enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating:

"Upon final

plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for
the lots and the road as per the contract."
27.

On

June

28,

1983

and

June

(Exhibit 21).

30, 1983, Felton and

Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09
and $106,899.14 respectively.

(Exhibit 44).

portion

installment payment due from

of

plaintiffs,

the June 30, 1983
a

check

from

Dan

Hunter

in

The remaining

the

amount

of

$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment.

(Exhibit

22).
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attorney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the
Sharps of the road and five lots.

The letter further ex-

plained that a final plat had not been recorded because M[a]s
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23).
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment.

(Exhibit 24.)

30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps
had breached the Closing Documents.
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31. On or about November 14, 1983, the June 30, 1983 default under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Exhibits 4 and 44).
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a
proposed

final plat,

which

was

later

recorded

with

Summit

County (hereinafter the proposed Hfinal plat"), and a Declaration of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Declaration

was prepared

on behalf

of Saunders by Heaton and

which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners.
(Exhibit 25).
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18,
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre parcel as originally contemplated
Memorandum

in the Earnest Money and the

of Closing Terms, but platted only the northern

portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Property unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage").

(Exhib-

it 1 ) .
34. The proposed final plat included an Owner's Dedication for a private road in the PUD and delineated the existence

and

location

of the private road

and certain utility

easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and
water systems.

(Exhibit 1 ) .
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton
to the Sharps further provided in pertinent part that:
At a later time in the near future, Hy
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the
platted subdivision along with his road
(White Pine Lane)....
We will handle
that matter when it is presented....
When those releases are made, pursuant
to your instruction we will insure that
rights are reserved in« White Pine Lane
for access for the southern portions of
the property purchased from you until
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 25 and 25a).
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John
Sharp.

The letter provided in pertinent part:

H

It is per-

fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western
boundary of Lot 6."

(Exhibit 26).

37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone
conversation

with

attorney

Heaton memorialized

by notes of

«

attorney Heaton in the margin of Felton's November 21, 1983
letter

(Exhibit 26).

Felton agreed that "access over road

[White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped property Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch.-

(Exhibit 26a).

38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized
the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating
to the June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27).
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39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consideration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access
over the private roadway

(White Pine Lane) in the event of

foreclosure, and pursuant

to their right of approval under

paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Consent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted:
[A] non-exclusive easement for water
lines, water tank and water systems
over, under and across the property,
shown here near the southwest corner of
the subject property, and specifically
described in the Declaration of Protective Covenants and reserving unto
the owners, for granting to the owners
of adjacent or nearby property, a
non-exclusive easement for utilities
and vehicular and pedestrian access
over the private roadway shown on the
plat and from the well sites as developed. (Emphasis added.)
[Exhibit

51).

As

additional

consideration

for

signing

the

Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a
portion of the Subject Property.
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, 1983 was recorded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by
the Sharps.

(Exhibit 1 ) . The CCRs were also recorded in the

office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and
the Consent

to Record was

attached

(Exhibit 51).
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as an exhibit thereto.

41. After recordation of the final plat, the CCRs and the
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of
the improvements on the Subject Property.

However, instead of

adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6,
supra, plaintiffs constructed

a small, private water system

for this development.
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches
(Exhibit 28).
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45).

No explanation

of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provided at trial.

Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as

a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and
question Associated Title for such delay.

No other request

for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps.
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do."

(Exhibit 30).

45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton requesting

the approval by the Sharps of a

••multi-family development- on the unplatted acreage, "which is
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the only way it [the development] will be economically feasible.H

(Exhibit 29).

A multi-family concept was never adopt-

ed.
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the
unplatted acreage] immediately.r

(Trial Transcript, p. 110,

hereinafter "R.w 110 and Exhibit 37).
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a requirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents.

(R. 334).

48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and
the unplatted
November

acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on

30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the

1984 property taxes due on the Subject Property

(Stipulation

of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquency

all

taxes

and

assessments

affecting

said

property...."

(Exhibit 2 ) .
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the
unplatted

acreage

in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the

unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage)
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-

-16-

foref remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5
and 14 of the Trust Deed.
50. Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment.

However,

on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709.47 (Exhibit 44).
51. As a result

of plaintiffs1

defaults, a Notice of

Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Subject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which description included Lots 1-5.
52.
letter

On

or

about

(Exhibit 55).
September

to Mr. Sharp acknowledging

24,

1985,

Felton

sent

a

receipt of the September

1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is being made to resolve the problem...."

(Exhibit 31).

Felton,

in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the
Sharps.
53.

Significantly,

as bearing

upon

the credibility of

plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents.

(Ex-

hibit 31).
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter
to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default
-17-

(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56) covering
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps' direction.

(Ex-

hibit 57).
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property,
excluding

Lots 1 through

5.

(Exhibit 58).

Other Notices

filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded
Lots 1 through 5.
56.

All

of

(Exhibits 3 and 36).
the

Notices

of

Default

and

Notices

of

Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specifically provided that such Notices are:
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments,
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters
of record enforceable in law (sic)
equity.
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58).
57. No payment at all was made when the final installment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986.
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed
Note

through

March

22,

1988

is

$557,642.46,

including

$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges
of 4% on each overdue payment.
diem rate of $183.32.

Interest is accruing at a per

(Exhibit 122).

59. Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the
release of

the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in
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November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent,
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985
installment payment when due.

Plaintiffs' first requests were

made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986,
respectively.

(Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time

in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a
release from the Sharps for 7.S acres of the unplatted acreage, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots"
only.

As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of

default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.
61. As plaintiff Felton testified,

M

the contract [Memo-

randum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that
would

require

a choice.H

After

the

release of Lots

1-5,

plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead
of Lot 6.
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton demanded

from

$73,000.00

as

the

Sharps

their

"cost

which are now available."

for
of

the

first

approximately

the sewer and water

(Exhibit 35).
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time

hook-ups

No demand for such

costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had
plaintiffs

provided

an

accounting

of

such

costs.

Before

trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61
for the complete costs for the construction of the improvements on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a).
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construction

of

improvements

on

and

to

the

Subject

Property

of

$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their demand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to
$43,706.00.

(Exhibit 66).

64. Prior
Saunders

told

to actual construction
the

Summit

County

of the sewer

Planning

system,

Commission

in a

meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to
go."

(Exhibit 79).

On or about September 16, 1983, Felton

wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a
sewer

line

up

the

County

road

from

Highway

U-224

to the

Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles."
(Exhibit 79).

Felton concluded the letter by declaring:

"In

the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will
test the validity of that requirement in court."
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages:
The sum of $117,297.15 being the
costs of off-site sewer which we
were, under protest, required to
install to service the subdivision.
***
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[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or
more sales and anticipate the damages,
loss of profit and interest at between
$250,000 and $500,000.
**•

[Dlamages for the loss of sale, reduction
in business and damages suffered in reduction to profit ....
(Exhibit 84).
66. Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United
States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2G90W,
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof
to recover their claimed damages.
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated:
Because of the imposition of the requirement that Plaintiffs construct an
off-site sewer approximately one mile in
length, the costs of developing the
entire project became prohibitive.
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7 ) .
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986,
Saunders declared:
At the present time I have recently found
out that the right-of-way servicing my
property has been forfeited by Summit
County contrary to law.
This will not
allow my development to proceed, will not
allow me to recover costs for the capital
improvement and significantly diminishes
the value of the property.
(Exhibit 107, p. 15).
69. In Saunders1 Federal Court affidavit dated March 17,
1986, he also swore:
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10.
As a result of the various
delays [caused by the County and the
SBSID], which are detailed below, the
market for exclusive building lots is now
virtually non-existent, cost of improvements escalated to be several times what
I ha.: anticipated, and much of the real
property in the project is threatened by
foreclosure.
(Exhibit 86, p. 3 ) .
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the
Sharps in the present case.

(R. 252 and 263; cf. Exhibits 60

with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs1
Verified Complaint herein).
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
72.
•

The

Sharps

did

not

interfere

with

plaintiffs'

attempts to market or sell the Subject Property.

=

73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer

|

to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consum-

§a

mated

2|
al

B . F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unre-

due to the failure of conditions

imposed by the one,

lated to any actions or statements of the Sharps.
88).
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(Exhibit

74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an
independent
price

appraisal

(Exhibit 88).

supporting

a $220,000

proposed

sales

The plaintiffs provided Sammons with a

letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been prepared by LeRoy Pia.

(Exhibit 9a). This appraisal stated that

Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000.

On or

about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde,
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9 ) .

The

November

(R.

11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons.

283-4).
75.

Saunders

had

given

Sammons

"the

impression"

that

plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not
been released from the Trust Deed.

(R. 389; see also R. 284).

76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which
letter stated

H

[t]he current litigation does not affect the

marketability or encumber that [Subject] property."

(Exhibit

89.)
77. After

the commencement

of this action, the Sharps

took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated September 30, 1986, to plaintiffs1 prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps * attorney, that
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the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this
proceeding dated May 14, 1987.
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water connection and service fees have been assessed.

The only convey-

ance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of the partnerships.

At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at

all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connection and service fees within the sales price of lots.

(R.

310-312).
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and
beyond

a $220,000

fees.

(R. 285).

land price for sewer or water connection

80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD
lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer."

(R. 310).

81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water]
improvement costs...."

At a $220,000 sales price it's "impos-

sible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to
the Subject Property.

M

You have to take a loss."

(R. 311-

312).
82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not
completed

or

operational,

nor

has

its

construction

been

-24/
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approved by the SBSID.

(Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103).

The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not
operational.

Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing

Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these
systems until they are "available.M

(Exhibit 15).

83. The sewer system constructed by plaintiffs has a
capacity to handle between 2,QQ£ and 3,800 connections.

(Ex-

hibit 86).
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connection" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the
Subject

Property

(Exhibit

it 80, paragraph 4(d)).

81, paragraph

4D;

see Exhib-

The "connection fee shall be paid by

the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to
the

Application

(the plaintiffs herein), except that the

SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection
fee."
85. The parties intended the language in the Earnest
Money concerning "same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous
with the language contained

in paragraph 7, Memorandum of

Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchaser.
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin
area are $2,000.00 each.

(See Testimony of John C. Brown and

Rex Ausburn, cf. Exhibit 86, p. 6).
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87. The Sharps

intended

and wanted

to be charged only

what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to connect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms.
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility easements shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed.
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25f 25a, 26 and 26a).
89. Correspondingly,

it was both the mutual intent and

agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the
roadway in event of default
which

(Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a),

agreement was later memorialized

Consent to Record.

and

recorded

in the

(Exhibit 51).

90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended
Notice of Trustee's Sale

(Exhibit

56) was inadvertent, un-

intentional and without malice.
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplatted acreage, the Sharps acted in good faith and relied on the
advice of attorney Jon Heaton.
92.
Associated

The

Sharps

Title

have

been

charged

in their efforts

trustees'

by

to foreclose the Subject

Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42).
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fees

93. Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the
Sharps.
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default."

(Exhibit

2).
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this
action and obtained
Order

(TRO) from

the issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the

Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Property.

The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400.

In a

hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained...."
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or
interest, either with or without

suit, the undersigned

agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee."
Paragraph

16

of

the

Trust

Deed

provided:

...

(Exhibit 3).,
"Upon

the

occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps]
shall have the option to . •. foreclose the Trust Deed ... and
Beneficiary

shall

be

entitled
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to recover

... a reasonable

y^*~-*

attorney's fee...."

(Exhibit 2; see also 1111 thereof).

Fur-

ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the
rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary ... and in exercising
any such powers
fees."

... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable

Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires

Trustor to "pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent

(10%) per

annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured
hereby."

Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-

vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment."

(Exhibit 15).

97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount
z

«

of $144,469.75.

2

z

98. The foregoing amount does not include any services

8

t

performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those servic-

<

| £

1 sopSa

es of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of

5£°<5
o«il;j9

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, responding to and arguing any post trial motions. The legal
fees for such matters may be supplemented later.
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99. The services rendered

by the law firm of Winder &

Haslam were reasonably necessary for the development of the
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates
charged are reasonable-and are in accordance with those rates
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar services.
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot.
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing
Terms, all "agreements contained

[t]herein shall survive the

closing of this transaction...."

(Exhibit 15).

102. The Sharps' defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an
action purporting to offset the security under the Trust Deed
and the rights and powers of the Sharps related to collecting
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof.
103. After closing the sale on the Subject Property, on or
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of
Default on or about September 16, 1985.

(R. 836; Exhibit 55).

Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the closing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default
on or about September 23, 1983.
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(R. 791; Exhibit 24).

For a

period of time after the filing of the first Notice of Default
on or about September 23, 1983, and
Notice of Default on September

after the filing of the

16, 1985

(R. 793), attorney

Heaton did represent the Sharps.
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this action.
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court herewith makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

Closing

Documents,

which

term

is

defined

in

Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to
the parties' closing of the sale of the Subject Property by
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract").
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985,
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November

30 of each respective year, are thereby in

breach of the Trust Deed.
3. Plaintiffs1

failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985

installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms.
4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and
continuing

and

first requested

were

uncured

when

plaintiffs

by plaintiffs for the roadway

February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986.
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releases

were

and Lot 6 on

5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under
the parties' Contract.
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of
their obligations under the terms of the parties1 Contract*
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own practice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot
6, for release by the Sharps.
8.

Because

the

plaintiffs'

material

and

continuing

breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs'
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage.
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway
or the unplatted

acreage shown on the final plat of to the

plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the parties' Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested.
10. Alternatively, the Sharps' execution of the Consent
to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release
of the roadway shown on such plat

in accordance with para-

graphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers
thereof

(including

the Sharps), and their invitees, guests,

heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for
vehicular

and pedestrian

access over, under and across the

private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and purchasers

thereof

(including

the Sharps) and

their heirs and

successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the
southwest

corner

of

the unplatted

acreage

as shown on the

final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I.
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests,
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in
Conclusion No. 11 above.

Further, the Sharps are estopped to
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deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Conclusion No. 11 above.
13. The Sharps, by the execution of the Consent to Record, are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the recorded

final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I.

The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive easements set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with
plaintiffs1

declaration

for

the extinguishment

of the non-

exclusive easement in favor of the unplatted acreage.
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (including the Sharps), and their successors in interest are entitled

to use of the private roadway

(White Pine Lane) for

access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and

incorporated

by

reference

herein,

as

a result

of the

mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memorialized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by
the part performance and

reliance of the Sharps on such let-

ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record.
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15. General partners in a partnership are bound by the
actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership
and by the actions of the partnership itself.
16. The

language

in paragraph

7 of the Memorandum of

Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguous,
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the
same.
17.
strated

The
that

extrinsic

evidence

the parties

presented

intended

at

trial

demon-

to allow the Sharps, at

their request, one connection each to both the culinary water
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and
operational.
18.

The

construction

costs

of

the culinary

water

and

sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in
violation of the reasonable value rule.
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems
still are not yet operational•

The Sharps are not obligated,

but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer
systems should such systems become operational•
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the
earlier

language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same

per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the
exorbitant

construction

costs

hook-ups.

Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as
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for culinary

water

and sewer

developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property
that they were and intended to be in this transaction.
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer
systems is $2,000.00 each.
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Notice of
Default (Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit
56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and
without malice.
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any
requested reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not
done in bad faith.

The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice

of their counsel, and did so in good faith.
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause
of action for failure to reconvey under U.C.A. §57-1-33.
U.C.A. S57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand
therefor is made by the Trustor.

The Sharps requested the

Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and
2

.

o

I

£

1

i
8
<

x

because of plaintiffs' subsequent breaches were under no obllgation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property.

|

25. As a result of plaintiffs' breaches of the Contract,

* >%

8 amUa
|||i2i

tne

Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of Default and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against

*• 5 R O < S

the Subject Property.

-35-

26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage.
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action
for slander of title against the Sharps.
act maliciously

The Sharps did not

or cause any special damages to the plain-

tiffs.
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation,
those under U.C.A. S57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too
remote,

conjectural

and

speculative.

The plaintiffs

have

failed to establish they have suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court concludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred.
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75
are
same.

reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the
Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-

ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's
fees

incurred

after

August

31, 1988

in preparation of the

Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any posttrial motions, in collecting

said Judgment by execution or

otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal.
30. The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to
post-judgment interest as provided by law.
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of
the Contract

by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to
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judgment

against

Saunders, Felton,

Interstate Rentals, Inc.

and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts:
a.

i.
ii.

iii.

Principal:

$

371,739.35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

$

14,869.57

TOTAL:

$

557,642.46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trustee's fees:

$

1,803.80

Court Costs:

$

2,881.04

$

144,088.75

Attorneys' fees through
August 31, 1988:

together

with

interest

thereon at the rate of 10% per

annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided

by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and

2

"2
A PROFESSIONAL CORI
SUITE 4004
Soul
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thereon at the rate of 12% per

annum.

~
2

32. As a result of the significant and material breaches

I
ITY,

:

interest

0 2668

post-judgment

: S ® H !2
JCO < S

of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining
Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable
Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued
and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved.
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33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September 1986 in
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted
by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of $30,970.63 for their
interest, attorney's fees and other damages incurred as a result

of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary

Restraining

Order and for which amounts the Sharps are not secured by the
fair market value of the Subject Property.
34. The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judgment,

together

accrued

with

interest

as set

forth

hereinabove and

costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public

auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attor.

neys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said

=

sums for the Sharps' attorney's fees, and the amount owing to

2

the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale

* Or*

and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums,

S*«

I^S
o <S

together with accrued

interest

thereon, or so much of said

sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any,
shall

be accounted

for and paid over to the Clerk of this
-38-

I3&3

Court subject to this Court's further order.
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law
for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the
period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs
above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by,
through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery
of

the

Sheriff's

Deed

to

the

subject

premises

that

the

grantees named therein be given possession thereof.
36. If a deficiency results after due and proper application of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are
entitled to be awarded a personal judgment against Saunders,
Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them,
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
37. The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their
request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 each.
38. The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the
plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action.
DATED this

day of

, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a
Utah general partnerhip;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
vs.
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C87-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
JOHN C SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J . RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a U t a h c o r p o r a t i o n ; KENNETH R. NORTON dba

APPENDIX C

INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,
and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants
M

John

C.

and

Geraldine

Y.

Sharp

(hereinafter

the

Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F.

Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice,

and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-

prises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

Investment

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Robert

"Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders

Corporation

appearing

by counsel

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.
defendant Kenneth R. Norton

Robert M.

Counterclaim

("Norton") appeared through his

counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs' Complaint

be dismissed, no cause of

action.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are indebted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following
amounts:
a.

i.
ii.

iii.

Principal:

$

371,739.35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

$

14,869.57

TOTAL:

$

557,642.46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trustee's fees:

$

1,803.80

Court Costs:

$

2,881.04

$

144,088.75

Attorneys' fees through
August 31, 1988:

together

with interest

thereon at the rate of 10% per

annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided

by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and

post-judgment

interest

annum.
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thereon at the rate of 12% per

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of
the Sharps1 reasonable attorney's fees as established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

that the

Restraining

matter

the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4,

1986 was wrongfully
solved.

entered

AND DECREED

Temporary
by

Order

ADJUDGED

in the above captioned

issued and it is hereby lifted and dis-

The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the

bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plaintiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject
premises.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as
described

in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches

Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may
be sufficient

to pay the amounts found to be due and owing

under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and

accrued

costs herein, and expenses of sale, be

sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State
of Utah, in the manner prescribed
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K

y law for such sales; that

said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by
him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his
costs,

disbursements

and

commission,

and

then pay

to the

Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs
of

this action,

then said

sums for the Sharps' attorneys'

fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes,
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued
interest

thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds

will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for
and

paid

over

to the Clerk

of this Court subject to this

Court's further order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs above named,
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named
therein be given possession thereof.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a
deficiency

results after due and proper
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application of the

proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded
a

personal

judgment

against

Saunders,

Felton,

Norton

and

Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND DECREED

that the

Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water and sewer systems on
White Pine Ranches Phase

I for

a connection

fee of $2,000

each.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a nonexclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude,
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and purchasers

thereof

(including

the

guests, heirs and successors

Sharps)

and

their invitees,

in interest, for utilities and

for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and
egress

for vehicular

and pedestrian

access over, under and

across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the
land

or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in

favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches
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Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine
Ranches Phase I.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Recorder's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's
Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises,
other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs
herein

coupled

with

plaintiffs'

declaration

for

the ex-

tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement in favor of the
unplatted acreage.
DATED this

-ZL

day of

<§tjffafa]fifr

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

Hort. p. Dennis Frederick
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Spinning a t * P^int South 89 d e g r e e s 43 f 36" West along the
H o n i l i n e of Lot 8, 173.42 f e e t fron the comer of Lata l
and 3 , 4 brass cap s e t by the U.S. General Land Office, s a i d
b r a s s cap a l s o being South 00 degrees 19 • 4 6" West along
s e c t i o n l i n e 133 6.14 f e e t from the Northeast-comer of
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt LaXe , Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 39 degrees 4 3 3 6 w
West a l o n g the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 3 2943.98 f e e t t o the
Northwest ccrr.tr erf Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 12*23"
ZASZ a l o n g tha Wast l i n a of Lot 7, 1312.34 f e e t to t h e *
Southwest- c o m e r of Lot 7; thtnea North 89 degraas 4 7 M l "
E a s t a l o n g the South l i n e of Lot 7, 332.67 f e e t ; thence
North 61 degrees 00'00* East 1956.90 f e e t ; thence North 47
d e g r e e s ll'lS"
l a s : 462.75 f i a t ; thence North- 42 degrees
44 UO" l a s t 35.63 £ t e t to t h t p o i n t of beginning.
LZSS ami excepting White Pine Ranches, Phase I, a Planned residential
Development, according to the official plat thereof on file axxl cf
record i n the Sennit County Recorder's Office, State of Utah.
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Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al.,
ORDER RE: MOTION TO SET
LIABILITY ON BOND

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN C. SHARP, et al.,

Civil No. C87-1621
(Judge J. Dennis Frederick)

Defendants.
JOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT FELTON, et al.,
Counterclaim-Defendants.
*

The Motion of defendants John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y.
Sharp

18

(hereinafter the "Sharps") came on regularly for hearing

2

J g3

*"5£°<9

before this Court on September 16, 1988.

Plaintiffs White Pine

Ranches,

H.

White

Pine

Enterprises,

Felton, and Saunders Land

Leon

Saunders,

Investment Corporation

Robert

(hereinafter

collectively "White Pine") appeared through their counsel,

APPENDIX D

P,

/.?<pj

Robert M. Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gay lord.

The

Sharps appeared through their counsel, Donald J. Winder, Kathy
A. F. Davis and Tamara K. Prince,

Tracy Collins Bank was repre-

sented by its counsel,. Douglas J. Parry.

No other parties in

this action appeared either in person or through their counsel.
The Court, having reviewed memoranda presented by counsel,
having

received and reviewed exhibits, having heard the argu-

ments of counsel, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and
enters the following in support of its Judgment entered against
plaintiffs f sureties:
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The 7.0414 acres of Lot 6, White Pine Ranches Phase I,

according to the final recorded plat filed in the Summit County
Recorder's Office, State of Utah, has a present fair market value per acre of $25,000.00, for a total present fair market value
of $176,035.00 (Ex. 97).
2.
Judgment

The unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "AM
entered

herein, with one sewer

and water

to the

connection

available, contains 27.6205 acres and has a present fair market
value of $20,000.00 per acre, for a total present fair market
value of $552,410.00 (R. 494 and Ex. 97).
3.

Therefore, the present fair market value of the prop-

erties upon which the Sharps may foreclose pursuant to the Judgment is $728,445o00.
4.
White

Under

Pine

the Judgment,

plaintiffs

this Court

jointly
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and

found various of the

severally

indebted

to the

Sharps in the total amount of $759,415.63, excluding interest at
the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps of trustee fees, Court costs, and attorneys1
fees, and until paid by plaintiffs, and excluding interest and
penalties assessed on delinquent property taxes from November
30, 1984, through November 30, 1987, and excluding property taxes accruing but unpaid for 1988.
5.

Accordingly, the Sharps are under secured by the amount

of $30,970.63, representing the difference between the Judgment
($759,415.63) and the present fair market value of these properties ($728,445.00).
6.

As a condition of the issuance of the Temporary Re-

straining Order herein, White Pine posted a bond in the amount
of $2,400.00 with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986,
and

subsequently,

security

was

pursuant

posted

to this Court's Order, additional

by Tracy

Collins

Bank

in the amount of

$50,000.00, which was filed January 11, 1988.
7.

A Temporary Restraining Order was issued in this matter

by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986.
8.
for

the

Interest on the principal due under the Trust Deed Not€
period

$66,913.08,

and

July

1,

interest

1986,
for

to
the

June

30,

period

1987,

July

1,

equalled
1987

tc

March 22, 1988, equalled $48,764.04 (Ex. 122).
9.

Delinquent property taxes due just for the year 198"

amounted to $2,144.15 for Lot 6 and $2,630.85 for the unplattec
acreage (Stipulation of counsel, R. 707-708).
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10.

Pursuant to the Second Supplement to Affidavit in Sup-

port of Request for Attorney's Fees, attorneys for the Sharps
were able to identify that at least four percent (4%) of their
total fees related to defense of White Pine's injunction.

Four

percent (4%) of $144,088.75 is equal to $5,763.55, excluding
legal services from and after January, 1988, through the trial
and

post-trial

motions

herei-n

(Supplement

to

Affidavit of

Donald J. Winder dated September 9, 1988).
Having made the above supplemental findings of fact, the
Court herewith makes and enters the following in support of its
Judgment entered against plaintiffs' sureties:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has previously ordered, adjudged and decreed

that the Temporary Restraining Order entered in this matter by
the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986, was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved.
2.

The Sharps, as the parties enjoined, are entitled to

recover their costs and damages, including attorney's fees, incurred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction.
3.
>

Having determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to

tz

?

the injunction, it is not necessary for this Court to inquire

C|

|

into the good faith or bad faith of plaintiffs in obtaining the

Jo

|

jj8 JZ I

injunction.

J; 8 s ^

4.

s8jslM2f!

The amount of interest alone which as accumulated since

September, 1986, when the injunction was first issued, far ex-

-4-

ceeds the amount of both plaintiffs' cash bond and the security
posted by Tracy Collins Bank.
DATED this

day of

, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge

Si

I

••at

3
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TabE

VALUE OF PROPERTY
A.

Value Trial Testimony (R.494) $20,000 acre
and water connection.
i.

with one sewer

Lot 6 (appraisal $25,000/acre x
7.0414 acres'1)

ii.

$176,035.00

Unplatted ($20,000/acre x 27.6205 acres)
TOTAL:

B.

552,410.00
$728,445.00

Debt
i.
ii.

Principal

<371,739.35>

Interest
a.

Through 3/22/88

<171,033.54>

b.

3/23/88 - 9/16/88 (per diem
$183.32, 178 days)

iii.
iv.

v.

vi.
vii.

< 32,630.96>

Late Fees

< 14,869.57>

Taxes
a.

Lot 6

< 10,932.78>

b.

Unplatted

<

9,435.84>

Attorney's Fees (through 8/31/88
without interest)

<144,469.75>

Trustee's Fees

<

1,803.80>

Costs

<

2,881.04>

TOTAL:

<$759,796 . 63>

Testimony at Bond Hearing $17,500/acre. Transcript of Pia
Testimony p. 35; Trial testimony $17,500/acre low end R.493
Acreage figures from appraisal (Ex. 97)
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